On March 23, 2026, the Romanian Government adopted by emergency ordinance a package of measures to manage the crisis on the fuel market. The context is real and serious: International crude oil and diesel quotations have increased by more than 25% compared to the beginning of February 2026, and Romania, which depends on imports for about 75% of its crude oil consumption, is directly exposed to this volatility.
State intervention was justified. But the instruments chosen are problematic. Two of the central measures of the GEO contain systemic risks which, if not corrected quickly, can turn a price problem into a problem of physical availability of fuels.
Romania is not in crisis because the commercial margin of gas stations is too high. It is in crisis because it does not produce enough fuel at home.
Margin cap: an asymmetry that could empty the market
Article 3 of the GEO limits the commercial surcharge for operators in the oil chain to 501TPTP3T of the 2025 average. Applied uniformly, without differentiation according to the cost structure of each operator, this mechanism creates a structural asymmetry with paradoxical consequences.
There are two basic categories of operators on the Romanian fuel market:
Domestic producers with own refineries (OMV Petrom, Rompetrol-KMG) operate against a domestic production cost that is relatively insensitive to international prices in the short term. For them, capping at 501TPTP3T of the 2025 average margin is workable.
Importers of finished products (Vitol, MOL, Socar, Oscar and others) buy diesel and gasoline on the international market at the current quotations, which are not subject to any cap mechanism. With quotations increasing by 25-50% compared to February 2026, their residual margin becomes insufficient to sustain trading at normal volumes.
The direct consequence is that importers become structurally unprofitable under the current cap regime. If they reduce supply streams or partially withdraw from the market, demand is concentrated exclusively on the domestic production of the two refineries. Domestic production covers less than 301TPTP3T of market needs. Physical shortages, especially in diesel, become a logical consequence of this dynamic, not a hypothetical scenario.
Simultaneous restriction of gasoline and diesel exports (Art. 4 GEO), without creating a symmetric mechanism to stimulate imports, amplifies this risk. Operators with refineries cannot evacuate temporary surpluses, but neither can they cover the shortfall left by the withdrawal of importers.
A measure designed to protect consumers risks draining the market of the very products they are looking for.
The alternative proposal from the industry to reduce the excise tax by the equivalent of the additional VAT gain generated by the high price (around 40 bani per liter), combined with a voluntary reduction by operators, would have maintained competitive neutrality between refiners and importers. The mechanism was rejected on grounds of short-term budgetary impact. The indirect economic cost of the potential shortage was not taken into account.
Biofuels sacrificed in shortage crisis
Article 5 para. (1) of the GEO allows, during the crisis, the commercialization of gasoline with a biofuel content of at least 2% by volume, instead of the 8% threshold set by GEO 33/2023 and in force since June 1, 2023.
It is a reduction by 75% of the blending obligation from E8-E10 to an almost insignificant level for a period of 6 months with the possibility of extension. The compensatory mechanism provided for in para. (2), subject to the wording „where appropriate”, is without any obligation of result.
The argument put forward in the preamble to the GEO is that supply chain pressures make it difficult to ensure simultaneous volumes of fuel and biofuel content. The argument may be operationally valid in the short term. Strategically, however, the logic is reversed.
Renewable and bio-based fuels are the only liquid fuels whose production can be localized on national territory, independent of Brent prices and geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. Removing the obligation to use them at the very moment when the volatility of hydrocarbon imports generated the crisis is a strategic error, not just a climate policy error.
The European context adds a further dimension. Romania only completed the primary transposition of Directive (EU) 2023/2413 (RED III) in November 2025, late and under pressure of a reasoned opinion of the European Commission in Case 2021/0333, with a deadline for compliance of November 24, 2025. The secondary legislation necessary for effective implementation, including for the sub-obligations on advanced biofuels and RFNBOs in transportation, remains under preparation at ANRE.
Each derogation from renewable fuel obligations, adopted as a matter of urgency and without a credible claw-back mechanism, undermines the investment already committed to domestic production of alternatives and sends a negative signal to the European Commission and investors in the sector.
If in every hydrocarbon price crisis we sacrifice alternative fuel obligations first, we will never build the alternative that makes these crises less painful.
What should be corrected and why it matters
Three immediate adjustments, feasible without abandoning the price stabilization objective:
1. Differentiation of the margin cap mechanism depending on the operator's cost structure. Importers of finished products should be able to operate with a margin calculated against the actual cost of purchase, not against a domestic benchmark that is not applicable to them. Alternatively, a compensation scheme for the cost differential with the international quotation would maintain import flows without jeopardizing the objective of limiting the final price.
2. Replacing the blending derogation with a temporary flexibility mechanism accompanied by clear quantitative post-crisis recovery obligations. The accumulated shortfall in meeting GHG targets from transport must be made up through mathematically calculated additional allowances with deadlines and penalties, not through discretionary formulations.
3. Opening a structural dialog on domestic production of alternative fuels in response to the vulnerability that generated the current crisis. Advanced biofuels, HVO and RFNBO are the only way for Romania to gradually reduce its dependence on hydrocarbon imports and, consequently, its exposure to March 2026-type crises.
Conclusion
The oil market crisis is real and requires public intervention. But the quality of the instruments chosen determines whether the intervention solves the problem or moves it. A margin cap that discourages imports in a market dependent 70-75% 70-75% on imports does not protect the consumer, it exposes him to scarcity. A biofuel waiver without a clawback mechanism does not buy time, loses credibility and postpones investments that would make such a crisis no longer possible.
Romania will not get out of this vulnerability by capping margins. It will get out by reducing dependency.
The Sustainable Fuels Association remains available for technical dialog with the competent authorities and invites the Ministry of Energy to initiate substantive consultations on the RED III implementation framework and on mechanisms to stimulate domestic production of alternative fuels.
Vlad Stoicescu is the President of the Association for Sustainable Fuels (ACS), an organization that brings together companies and investors active in the alternative fuels, energy storage and clean transport infrastructure sectors in Romania.